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Abstract
This paper develops a real options framework to analyze the behavior of stock
returns in mergers and acquisitions. In this framework, the timing and terms of
takeovers are endogenous and result from value-maximizing decisions. The impli-
cations of the model for abnormal announcement returns are consistent with the
available empirical evidence. In addition, the model generates new predictions re-
garding the dynamics of firm-level betas for the time period surrounding control
transactions. Using a sample of 1086 takeovers of publicly traded US firms between
1985 and 2002, we present new evidence on the dynamics of firm-level betas, which
is strongly supportive of the model’s predictions.
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I. Introduction
Decisions that aﬀect the scope of the firm are amongst the most important faced by
management, and amongst the most studied by academics. Mergers and acquisitions
are classic examples of such decisions. While there exists a rich literature that examines
why firms should merge or restructure, we still know very little on the asset pricing
implications of these major corporate events. This paper develops a model for the
dynamics of stock returns in mergers and acquisitions, in which the timing and terms of
takeovers are endogenous and result from value-maximizing decisions. The implications
of the model for abnormal announcement returns are consistent with the available
empirical evidence. In addition, the model generates new predictions regarding the
dynamics of firm-level betas for the time period surrounding control transactions. Using
a sample of 1086 takeovers of publicly traded US firms between 1985 and 2002, we
present new evidence on the behavior of stock returns through the merger episode,
which is strongly supportive of the model’s predictions.
Control transactions generally create value either by exploiting synergies or by
improving eﬃciency through consolidation and disinvestment. In this paper, we present
a theory that encompasses both motives and examine the implications of this theory
for stock returns. Specifically, we consider a model in which two public firms can enter
a takeover deal. In the takeover, the more ineﬃcient firm sells its assets to the more
eﬃcient one and thereby puts its resources to their best use. After the takeover, the
merged entity has the possibility either to invest in new assets or to divest some of
the acquired assets. Our model therefore emphasizes the role played by eﬃciency and
capital reallocation in the timing and terms of takeovers.1 It also contributes to the
literature that examines the impact of growth options and disinvestment opportunities
on the dynamics of mergers and acquisitions.
In our model, investment decisions share two important characteristics. First, there
is uncertainty surrounding their benefits. Second, these decisions are at least partially
irreversible. The decision to enter a takeover deal, expand operations, or divest assets
can then be regarded as the problem of exercising a real option. One essential diﬀerence
between the option to enter the takeover deal and the options available to the merged
entity after the takeover is that the former involves two firms. This implies that the
timing and terms of the takeover are the outcome of an option exercise game in which
each firm determines an exercise strategy for its real option, while taking into account
1As discussed in the paper, this motive for mergers implies that the bidder has a higher Tobin’s q
than the target. However, it need not imply large diﬀerences in market-to-book ratios as the values of
the bidding and target firms also reflect the potential benefits associated with the restructuring, which
tends to reduce the relative diﬀerences in market values.
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the other firm’s exercise strategy (see also Grenadier, 2002). By contrast, the options to
expand or divest represent standard investment decisions that can be made in isolation.
Because the takeover surplus depends on the operating options available to the merged
entity, the derivation of value-maximizing strategies in the paper proceeds in two steps.
The first step determines the exercise strategies for the expansion and contraction
options of the merged entity. The second step derives the equilibrium restructuring
strategies, taking the optimal expansion and contraction strategies as given.
Following the determination of equilibrium exercise strategies, the implications of
the equilibrium for stock returns are analyzed. Two important contributions follow
from this analysis. First, we provide a complete characterization of the dynamics of
firm-level betas through the merger episode and show that beta changes dramatically
in the time period surrounding takeovers. Notably, we demonstrate that depending on
the relative risks of the bidding and the target firm before the takeover, the beta of
the bidding firm might increase or decrease prior to the takeover. In particular, we
show that when the acquiring firm has a higher (lower) pre-announcement beta than
its target firm, the risk of the option to enter the takeover deal is higher (lower) than
the risk of the underlying assets. As the takeover becomes more likely, the value of
the option to merge increases as a percentage of total firm value. Hence the (priced)
risk of the acquiring firm increases and so does its beta. Therefore, our model predicts
that we should observe a run-up (run-down) in the beta of the bidding firm prior to
the takeover when the acquiring firm has a higher (lower) beta than its target.
The second key contribution of this paper relates to the change in beta at the time
of the takeover. By exercising their real options, firms change the riskiness of their
assets and therefore aﬀect their betas and expected stock returns. Before the merger,
shareholders of the bidding firm hold an option to enter the takeover deal. By merging
with the target, bidding shareholders exercise their (call) option and change the nature
of the firm’s assets. It is commonly understood that (call) option exercise should trigger
a reduction in beta and expected returns. Our results challenge this intuition. We show
that the sign of the change in beta at the time of the takeover depends on the relative
risks of the bidding and target firms. As a result, the long-run performance of the
merged entity may be lower or higher than the performance of the bidding firm prior
to the takeover. We also show that the magnitude of the change in beta at the time
of the takeover depends on several characteristics of the deal such as the presence of
bidder competition, saymmetric information, or follow-up options.
To test our model, we form a sample of large control transactions based on the
Securities Data Company’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers & Acquisitions database. We restrict
our attention to publicly traded firms and obtain a sample of 1086 takeovers with an-
nouncement dates ranging from January 1, 1985, to June 30, 2002. We first examine
2
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abnormal announcement period returns for our sample. The data demonstrate the
same general patterns that have been documented in the literature. We then turn
to the analysis of firm-level betas by estimating monthly betas calculated from daily
returns. We follow the high-frequency or “realized beta” approach of Andersen et al.
(2005) and find that firm-level betas vary dramatically in the time period surrounding
the announcement of a deal. More specifically, our analysis reveals that beta does
not exhibit any increase or decrease prior to the takeover and drops only moderately
after a merger announcement for the full sample of deals. However, if we split our
sample into two subgroups in which acquiring firms have either a higher or a lower
pre-announcement beta than their targets, the patterns we find in the beta of acquir-
ing firms are consistent with the model’s predictions. Beta first increases slowly and
then declines upon announcement for the subsample of deals in which the beta of the
bidder exceeds the beta of the target. Beta first declines slowly and then rises upon
announcement for the other subsample of deals.
This paper continues a line of research using real options models to analyze mergers
and acquisitions. Margrabe (1978) is the first to model takeovers as exchange options.
In his model, takeovers involve a zero-sum game and timing is exogenous. Lambrecht
(2004) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) study takeovers using a real options setting
with endogenous timing. Magsiri, Mello, and Ruckes (2005) study a firm’s decision to
grow internally or externally by making an acquisition. Finally, Morellec (2004) and
Lambrecht and Myers (2005, 2006) examine the relation between manager-shareholder
conflicts and the external market for corporate control. This paper extends the existing
literature in two important dimensions. First, we model the operating options available
to the merged entity after the takeover. This allows us to make a clear distinction
between mergers that create growth opportunities and mergers that lead to divestitures,
spin-oﬀs, or carve-outs. Second, and more importantly, our model also adds to the
literature by characterizing explicitly the dynamic behavior of stock returns through
the merger episode. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first that examines
the impact of takeovers on stock returns and firm-level betas.2
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the basic
model of mergers and acquisitions. Section III derives the optimal exercise policies
for the firms’ real options. Section IV derives closed-form results on the dynamics of
beta and long-run performance. Section V tests our predictions. Section VI concludes.
Technical developments are gathered in the Appendix.
2From a modelling perspective, our paper also relates to the literature that analyzes asset pricing
implications of corporate investment decisions using real options models [see e.g. Berk, Green, and
Naik (1999), Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2005a, 2005b), Cooper (2005), or Zhang (2005)].
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II. A dynamic model of takeovers
Consider two public firms, B and T , with capital stocks KB and KT and stock market
valuations SB and ST . Each firm owns assets in place that generate a random stream of
cash flows as well as an option to enter a takeover deal. Accordingly, the stock market
valuation of each firm has two components and is given by
SB (X,Y ) = KBX +GB (X,Y ) , and ST (X,Y ) = KTY +GT (X,Y ) (1)
where the first term on the right hand side of these equations is the present value of
the cash flows generated by assets in place, denoted by X and Y per unit of capital,
and the second term is the surplus associated with a potential restructuring. In the
analysis below, B and T are respectively the bidding firm and the target firm. These
roles are exogenously assigned and are determined by firms’ specific characteristics, not
modelled in this paper.
Throughout the paper, management acts in the best interest of stockholders and
seeks to maximize the intrinsic firm value when determining the timing and terms of
takeovers. In our base case environment, we consider that takeovers create value by
generating synergy gains. Notably, we follow the literature that emphasizes the role
played by eﬃciency and capital reallocation in determining the timing and terms of
takeovers in assuming that net synergy gains are given by
G (X,Y ) = KT [α (X − Y )− ωY ] , (α,ω) ∈ R2++. (2)
In this equation, the parameter α > 0 represents the improvement in the value of the
target firm after the takeover. The factor ω > 0 accounts for proportional sunk costs
of implementation paid at the time of the takeover (introducing costs for the bidder
would not aﬀect any of the results). This equation suggests that acquiring firms are
better performers (X > Y ) and that the takeover results in a more eﬃcient allocation
of resources. This specification is consistent with the fact that acquirers generally have
higher Tobin’s q than their target companies [see Lang, Stulz and Walking (1989),
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) or Andrade and Staﬀord (2004) for evidence supporting
this view]. It need not imply however large diﬀerences in market-to-book ratios as the
values of the bidding and target firms also reflect the potential benefits associated
with the takeover (which reduces the relative diﬀerences in market values between
the two firms). In the model extensions we will consider additional dimensions of
the takeover process that will either increase the takeover surplus, such as follow-up
operating options, or reduce it, such as competition for the target firm.
The timing of takeovers typically depends on the combined takeover surplus as well
as its allocation among participating firms. It also depends on several dimensions of
4
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the firms’ environment such as ongoing uncertainty or the ability to reverse decisions.
In this paper, we consider that takeovers are irreversible (unless the firm has a follow-
up disinvestment option). In addition, we assume that the present value of the cash
flows from the core businesses of participating firms evolves according to the stochastic
diﬀerential equation:
dA (t) = (µA − δA)A (t) dt+ σAA (t) dWA (t) , A = X,Y, (3)
where µA, δA > 0 and σA > 0 are constant parameters and WX and WY are standard
Brownian motions. The correlation coeﬃcient between WX and WY is constant, equal
to ρ ∈ (−1, 1). In the analysis that follows, we consider that there exist two traded
assets with market betas βX and βY , which are perfectly correlated with X and Y , and
a riskless bond with dynamics dBt = rBtdt. This allows us to construct a risk neutral
measure Q under which the drift rates of X and Y are given by r − δA, for A = X,Y .
III. The timing and terms of takeovers
A. Base case
In our model, takeovers present participants in the deal with an option to exchange one
asset for another — they can exchange their shares in the initial firm for a fraction of the
shares of the merged entity. As a result, the timing of takeover deals is determined by
the restructuring strategy that maximizes the value of the exchange option. To solve
the optimization problem of participating firms, it will be useful to rewrite the surplus
created by the takeover as: G(X,Y ) = Y KT [αR− (α+ ω)], with R ≡ X/Y . This
expression shows that we can solve shareholders’ optimization problem by looking only
at the relative valuations of the bidding and target firms’ core businesses R. In addition,
because the value of the surplus increases with the ratio of core business valuations R,
the value-maximizing strategy is to enter the takeover deal when R reaches a higher
threshold Rm.
One essential diﬀerence between the option to enter the takeover deal and standard
real options is that the former involves two firms. This implies that the timing and terms
of the takeover have to be derived in two steps. The first step determines the optimal
takeover threshold for each set of shareholders given a sharing rule ξ for the takeover
surplus. One obtains a pair (ξ,RB(ξ)) for bidding shareholders and a pair (ξ,RT (ξ))
for target shareholders. The second step consists in deriving endogenously the sharing
rule by making the two takeover thresholds coincide: RB(ξ) = RT (ξ) = R∗(ξ∗). The
equilibrium (ξ∗, R∗(ξ∗)) is optimal for both players and is such that both players want
to enter the game at the same time. This is the only renegotiation proof equilibrium
[see also Lambrecht (2004) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2005)].
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Suppose that the takeover agreement specifies that a fraction ξ of the new firm
accrues to bidding shareholders after the takeover and denote by V (X,Y ) the value of
the combined firm after the takeover, defined by
V (X,Y ) = KBX +KTY + α (X − Y )KT (4)
When exercising the option to merge, bidding shareholders give up their claims in their
firm, worth KBX, for a fraction ξ of the new entity net of the sunk implementation
costs, worth ξ [V (X,Y )− ωYKT ].3 The payoﬀ from exercising the option to merge for
bidding shareholders is thus given by: ξ [V (X,Y )− ωYKT ]−KBX. This implies that
we can write their optimization problem as:
OmB (X,Y ) = supT mB
EQ{e−rT mB [ξ(V (XT mB , YT mB )− ωYT mB KT )−KBXT mB ]},
where EQ denotes the expectation operator associated with the risk neutral measure Q
and T mB is the first time to reach the takeover threshold selected by bidding sharehold-
ers. Similarly, target shareholders can exchange their initial claims, worth KTY , for a
fraction 1− ξ of the new entity. Hence the optimization problem of target shareholders
can be written as
OmT (X,Y ) = supT mT
EQ{e−rT mT [(1− ξ) (V (XT mB , YT mB )− ωYT mB KT )−KTYT mT ]}.
where T mT is the first time to reach the threshold selected by target shareholders.
Denote by ϑ > 1 and ν < 0 the positive and negative roots of the quadratic equation:
1
2
¡
σ2X − 2ρσXσY + σ2Y
¢
(ϑ− 1)ϑ+ (δY − δX)ϑ = δY ,
and define
Π(z) = z (βX − βY ) + βY (5)
for z = ϑ, ν. Solving these optimization problems yields the following result. (Proofs
for all propositions are given in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 The value-maximizing restructuring policy for participating firms is to
merge when the ratio of core business valuations R ≡ X/Y reaches the cutoﬀ level
Rm =
ϑ
ϑ− 1
ω + α
α
, (6)
3This specification implies that each firm incurs a cost at the time of the takeover as in Lambrecht
(2004). In the Appendix we show that when bidding shareholders pay the full takeover cost, the sharing
rule for the combined firm adjusts to make up their loss. As a result this assumption has not bearing
on the timing of the takeover or on the surplus it creates.
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for which RmT = R
m
B . Denote by T m the first time to reach the takeover threshold. The
beta of the shares of bidding shareholders satisfies
βt =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
KBXβX +Π(ϑ)OmB (X,Y )
KBX +OmB (X,Y )
, for t < T m
v(X,Y )
V (X,Y )
, for t > T m
(7)
where Π(·) is defined in (5) and
v(X,Y ) = βXXVX (X,Y ) + βY Y VY (X,Y ) ,
and where, for t < T m, the value of the restructuring option for bidding shareholders
is given by
OmB (X,Y ) = Y [ξ (V (R
m, 1)− ωKT )−KBRm]
µ
R
Rm
¶ϑ
.
Proposition 1 highlights several interesting features of takeover deals. First, and
as shown in Morellec and Zhdanov (2005), the timing of takeovers depends on the
growth rate and volatility of cash flows from the firms’ core businesses as well as the
correlation coeﬃcient ρ between business risks. In particular, holding their covariance
fixed, a greater variance for the changes in X and Y implies more uncertainty over their
ratio, and hence an increased incentive to wait. Holding their variances fixed, a greater
covariance between the changes in X and Y implies less uncertainty over their ratio,
and hence a reduced incentive to wait. These timing eﬀects come from the optionality
of the decision to enter the takeover deal and are reflected in the factor ϑ/(ϑ − 1),
which captures the option value of waiting. If this option had no value, shareholders
would follow the simple NPV rule, according to which one should invest as soon as the
takeover surplus is positive (i.e. as soon as R > (ω + α)/α).
Second, the value of the option to enter the takeover deal consists of two compo-
nents. The first component is the surplus accruing to shareholders at the time of the
option exercise. The second one is the present value of $1 contingent on the option
being exercised (i.e. a stochastic discount factor), which takes the familiar expression
Rϑ (Rm)−ϑ. Third, the beta of the shares of bidding shareholders evolves stochastically
through the merger episode. In particular, the beta dynamics are driven by changes in
asset values and the decision to enter the takeover deal (at t = T m). By merging with
the target, bidding shareholders exercise their call option to enter the takeover deal.
Since call options are riskier than the assets that they are written on, economic intu-
ition suggests that this option exercise should trigger a reduction in the shares’ beta.
As shown in Section IV, the magnitude and sign of the change in beta at the time of
the option exercise depends on several factors including the potential heterogeneity in
business risk between bidding and target firms.
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B. Extensions
In this section, we present two extensions of the basic model that aim at capturing
some of the main features of takeover deals. In the first extension, we incorporate the
follow-up operating options that characterize a large fraction of takeover deals. In the
second extension we incorporate competition and asymmetric information to generate
abnormal announcement returns. In section 4 we show that adding these features does
not aﬀect our conclusions regarding the behavior of firm-level betas in takeover deals.
1. Mergers with follow-up options
Consider that after the takeover the successful bidder holds both a real option to expand
operations by a factor Λ at a cost λ(X + Y ) and a real option to divest fraction 1−Θ
of its assets (or shut down if Θ = 0) at a price θ(X+Y ).4 Because the takeover surplus
depends on the operating options available to the merged entity, the derivation of value-
maximizing strategies for such deals proceeds in two steps. The first step determines
the exercise strategies for the expansion and contraction options of the merged entity.
The second step derives the equilibrium restructuring strategies, taking the optimal
expansion and disinvestment strategies as given.
Denote by V (X,Y ) the value of the combined firm ignoring the follow-up options,
defined by equation (4). For any values of X and Y , the payoﬀ of the disinvestment
option and expansion options are respectively given by
A(X,Y ) = θ(X + Y )− (1−Θ)V (X,Y ) and B(X,Y ) = (Λ− 1)V (X,Y )− λ(X + Y ).
Again the payoﬀ from the options to divest assets and to expand satisfy A(X,Y ) =
Y A(R, 1) and B(X,Y ) = Y B(R, 1). As a result, the value-maximizing strategy can
be characterized by two constant thresholds Rd and Re, with Re > Rd, such that the
firm should divest assets if and when (R (t))t≥0 reaches R
d before Re or expand if it
reaches Re before reaching Rd. Denote by T d the first passage time to the disinvestment
threshold and by T e the first passage time to the expansion threshold. We can write
the value of the firm’s portfolio of real options after the takeover as
Oc (X,Y ) = sup
{T d,T e}
ξEQ
n
1T d<T e
h
e−rT
d
A(XT d , YT d)
i
+ 1T e<T d
£
e−rT
e
B(XT e , YT e)
¤o
,
where 1ω is the indicator function of ω. The first term in the curly brackets represents
the value of the option to divest. The second term accounts for the value of the option
4 In this section, we implicitly assume that in some states of nature these assets are worth more to a
buyer, and the buyer is hence willing to pay more for them. Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) show that
partial-firm asset sales improve the productivity of transferred assets by eﬀectively redeploying assets
from firms that have less of an ability to exploit them to firms with more of an ability.
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to expand. As before, this expression shows that the value of the firm’s follow-up
options is a product of two factors; that is, the surplus associated with the follow-up
option at the time of exercise and the present value of $1 contingent on exercise.
Consider next the value of the option to merge and denote by Sc(X,Y ) the value
of the firm after the takeover net of the sunk investment costs, defined by
Sc(XT mB , YT mB ) = V (XT mB , YT mB ) +O
c(XT mB , YT mB )− ωYT mB KT .
When exercising the option to merge, bidding shareholders give up their claims in their
firm, worth KBX, for a fraction ξ of the new entity. As a result, their optimization
problem can be written as
OmB (X,Y ) = supT mB
EQ{e−rT mB [ξSc(XT mB , YT mB )−KBXT mB ]},
where T mB is the first time to reach the takeover threshold selected by bidding share-
holders. Similarly, the optimization problem of target shareholders can be written
as
OmT (X,Y ) = supT mT
EQ{e−rT mT [(1− ξ)Sc(XT mB , YT mB )−KTYT mT ]}.
where T mT is the first time to reach the threshold selected by target shareholders.
Denote by L(R) the present value of $1 to be received the first time R reaches Rd,
conditional on R reaching Rd before reaching Re. In addition, denote by H(R) the
present value of one dollar to be received the first time that R reaches Re, conditional
on R reaching Re before Rd. We then have the following result.
Proposition 2 The value-maximizing restructuring policy is to merge when the ratio
of core business valuations R ≡ X/Y reaches the cutoﬀ level Rm solving
KT [αR
m (ϑ− 1)− ϑ (α+ ω)] + (ϑ− ν) (Rm)ν J(z) = 0,
where
J(z) = Y [(Re)zA(Rd, 1)− (Rd)zB(Re, 1)][(Re)ϑ (Rd)ν − (Re)ν (Rd)ϑ]−1,
and for which RmT = R
m
B . The value-maximizing expansion and disinvestment thresholds
Re and Rd are defined by Re = yRd where y > 1 solves
ν
ν − 1
£
yϑ (1−Θ) + (Λ− 1)
¤
(1− α)KT − λ− θyϑ
θyϑ + λy − [(1−Θ) yϑ + (Λ− 1) y] (KB + αKT )
=
ϑ
ϑ− 1
[yν (1−Θ) + (Λ− 1)] (1− α)KT − λ− θyν
θyν + λy − [(1−Θ) yν + (Λ− 1) y] (KB + αKT )
9
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and
Rd =
ν
ν − 1
£
yϑ (1−Θ) + (Λ− 1)
¤
(1− α)KT − λ− θyϑ
θyϑ + λy − [(1−Θ) yϑ + (Λ− 1) y] (KB + αKT )
.
The beta of the shares of bidding shareholders is given by
βt =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
KBXβX +Π(ϑ)OmcB (X,Y )
KBX +OmB (X,Y )
, t < T m
v(X,Y ) + (βX − βY )
£
νRνJ(ϑ)− ϑRϑJ(ν)
¤
+ βYO
c (X,Y )
V (X,Y ) +Oc (X,Y )
, t ∈
£T m, T e ∧ T d¤
v(X,Y )
V (X,Y )
, t > T e ∧ T d
(8)
where Π(·) is defined in (5), OmcB (X,Y ) = OmB (X,Y ) + ξOc(X,Y ) for t < T m, and
Oc (X,Y ) =
(
Y
£L(Rm)A(Rd, 1) +H(Rm)B(Re, 1)¤ ¡ RRm ¢ϑ , t < T m
Y
£L(R)A(Rd, 1) +H(R)B(Re, 1)¤ t ∈ £T m,T e ∧ T d¤
In these expressions, the stochastic discount factors L(R) and H(R) are defined by
L(R) = (R
e)ϑRν − (Re)ν Rϑ
(Re)ϑ (Rd)ν − (Re)ν (Rd)ϑ
, and H(R) = R
ϑ
¡
Rd
¢ν −Rν ¡Rd¢ϑ
(Re)ϑ (Rd)ν − (Re)ν (Rd)ϑ
,
and V (X,Y ), v(X,Y ) and OmB (X,Y ) are defined as in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2 provides the value-maximizing merger and operating policies when
the takeover provides the new entity with a real option to expand or divest assets. The
value of the follow-up option reported in Proposition 2 takes the familiar functional
form: It is the product of the surplus created by the follow-up option (to divest or
expand) and a stochastic discount factor. In this case however this discount factor is
itself the product of two terms, one reflecting the probability and the timing of the
merger (given by (R)ϑ (Rm)−ϑ) and the other reflecting the probability and the timing
of the exercise of the follow-up option, conditional on the takeover being consummated
(given by L(Rm) for the option to divest and by H(Rm) for the option to expand).
The main diﬀerence between Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 lies in the beta of the
shares of bidding shareholders. As in Proposition 1, the beta evolves as a function of
changes in asset values and value-maximizing investment decisions (at T m and T e∧T d).
In this case however, the option to disinvest is akin to a put option. Because the
elasticity ν of the put option value with respect to the value of the underlying asset is
negative, exercising the disinvestment option may increase firm risk and thus expected
stock returns. Interestingly, once the operating option is exercised (i.e. for t > T e∧T d),
the functional form of the betas for the shares of bidding shareholders does not depend
on the past nature of this option. Thus, while operating options aﬀect the size of the
new entity, they should not aﬀect long-run betas once they are exercised.
10
Fo
r a
n 
el
ec
tro
ni
c 
co
py
 o
f t
hi
s 
pa
pe
r, 
pl
ea
se
 v
isi
t: 
ht
tp
://
ss
rn
.c
om
/a
bs
tra
ct
=8
86
71
4
2. Mergers with multiple bidders and asymmetric information
This subsection extends the analysis reported in subsection A in two dimensions. First
we consider that several potential acquirers, that diﬀer in terms of synergy benefit α,
can compete for the target.5 For clarity of exposition and without loss in generality, we
will consider a situation in which there are two potential acquirers, firm 1 and firm 2.
Second, we consider that management has complete information regarding the potential
benefits of the takeover, but can not communicate this information to shareholders [as in
Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2005b) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2005)]. Outside
stockholders have imperfect information and decide to accept or reject takeover bids
based on the informed manager’s recommendation. Because insider trading laws (and
possibly wealth constraints) prohibit managers from trading on their inside information,
managers do not sell or buy their own stock to restore eﬃcient pricing. Thus, market
prices reflect the information set of uninformed investors.
In such an environment, participating shareholders face two sources of uncertainty.
The first source of uncertainty relates, as before, to the cash flows from the firms’
core businesses. The second source of uncertainty relates to the parameters driving
the synergy gain. In particular, we consider that ω is observable to all investors. By
contrast, α is only observable to the managers of participating firms.6 While outside
investors can not observe α, they have prior beliefs about its possible values and update
these beliefs by observing the behavior of the two firms. Specifically, as shown in
Proposition 1, the value-maximizing policy for each α is to invest when the process
(R (t))t≥0 first crosses a monotonic threshold R
∗ (α) from below. At the time of the
restructuring, investors observe (R (t))t≥0 and infer the value of α using the mapping
α 7→ R∗ (α). Before then, they learn about the value created by the takeover by
observing the path of (R (t))t≥0. When (R (t))t≥0 reaches a new peak and the firm does
not invest, the market revises its beliefs regarding the true value of α. In addition, since
part of the uncertainty remains unresolved until the announcement of the takeover, the
model generates abnormal returns around takeover announcements.
To determine the timing and terms of the takeover in this environment, we first
examine the optimization problem of bidding shareholders. Once the takeover contest
5 In our model, targets are scarce and competition between multiple bidders hurts the acquirer. See
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and De, Fedenia, and Triantis (1996) for evidence supporting this view.
6A number of factors may explain this informational advantage. First, as emphasized by Jensen
and Meckling (1992), the transfer of information may involve costly delays, and for some decisions such
costs can be excessive, including sometimes the complete loss of opportunities. Second, management’s
knowledge about future market demand evolves continuously, and it may be too costly to frequently
communicate this information. Finally, this information may simply be “soft” in the sense of Stein
(2002) and cannot be communicated easily to investors (for example it might relate to management’s
ability to make diﬀerent corporate cultures, governance systems, or established brands fit together).
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is initiated, both bidders submit their bids in the form of the fraction of the new firm’s
equity to be owned by target shareholders after the takeover. The maximum value
of that fraction, or maximum price that a bidder is willing to pay, makes the bidder
indiﬀerent between winning and losing the takeover contest. Assume that both bidders
belong to the same industry so that their cash flows are driven by the same process X.
Then the breakeven stake of bidder i solves
ξbei (αi) [V (X,Y ;αi)− ωYKT ]−KBX = 0, i = 1, 2.
Assume that we adopt a Nash equilibrium and let V (X,Y ;α1) > V (X,Y ;α2) (i.e.
α1 > α2). Depending on parameter values, two mutually exclusive equilibria may arise.
In the first equilibrium, the losing bidder (firm 2) is weak in the sense that the value
associated with the share oﬀered to target shareholders by the winning shareholders is
greater than the breakeven value of the weaker bidder:
(1− ξ) [V (X,Y ;α1)− ωYKT ] > (1− ξbe2) [V (X,Y ;α2)− ωYKT ] .
In this equilibrium, the takeover takes place the first time the ratio of core business
valuations reaches the threshold Rm(α1) defined in Proposition 1. Moreover, bidding
shareholders get a fraction ξ (α1) of the combined firm, as defined in Proposition 1.
In the second equilibrium, the losing bidder is strong and the winning bidder has to
oﬀer an ownership stake in the combined firm to the target such that the value to the
target of dealing with bidder 1 is not less than that of dealing with bidder 2. Denote by
ξ1max(X,Y ) the maximum share of the new entity that the winning bidder can keep.
This share is defined by:
[V (X,Y ;α1)− ωYKT ] [1− ξ1max(X,Y )]| {z } = V (X,Y ;α2)− ωYKT −KBX| {z }
Value of dealing with bidder 1 Maximum value with bidder 2
which can also be expressed as
ξ1max(X,Y ) =
KBX +KT (α1 − α2) (X − Y )
V (X,Y ;α1)− ωYKT
. (9)
In this equilibrium, the timing of the takeover is then defined by the equality
ξ1max(R, 1) =
(ϑ− 1)R (KB + α1KT )− ϑ (α1 + ω)KT
(ϑ− 1)R (KB + α1KT )− ϑ (α1 + ω − 1)KT
, (10)
where the right hand side of this equation has been obtained by solving the uncon-
strained reaction function of target shareholders, RmT defined in Appendix A, for ξ. We
then have the following result.
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Proposition 3 When there is competition for the target and α1 > α2, the takeover
takes place the first time the ratio of core business valuations reaches the threshold R∗
defined by R∗ = min [Rm(α1), Rcomp] , where R∗ = Rm(α1) defined in Proposition 1
when the losing bidder is weak and R∗ = Rcomp solving
ξ1max(R, 1) = I[R
m
T (ξ)]
when the losing bidder is strong. In this equation, I (·) inverts RmT (ξ), meaning that
I [R (ξ)] = ξ for all ξ, and RmT (ξ) is the takeover threshold selected by target sharehold-
ers for bidder 1 in the absence of competition. Moreover, the share of the combined
firm accruing to bidding shareholders is given by
ξ = min
∙
ξ1max(R
∗, 1),
(ω + α1)KB
(ω + α1)KB + α1KT
¸
,
where the min function takes a value equal to its first argument when competition erodes
the ownership share of bidding shareholders and a value equal to its second argument
otherwise. When competition erodes the ownership share of bidding shareholders, the
beta of their shares before the takeover is given by
βt =
KBXβX +Π(ϑ)OmBi(X,Y )
KBX +OmBi(X,Y )
, for t < T m, (11)
where Π(·) is defined in (5), and, for t ≤ T m, we have
OmBi(X,Y ) =
P
α1∈Ωp1(t)
P
α2∈Ωp2(t)
Pr (α1, α2) 1α1>α2Y KT (α1 − α2) (R∗ − 1)
µ
R
R∗
¶ϑ
,
and where Ωpi (t) is the time−t posterior sample space of αi, i = 1, 2. For t > T mi , the
beta of the shares of bidding shareholders is given as in Proposition 1.
Proposition 3 highlights several important results. First, competition for the target
firm erodes the ownership stake of bidding shareholders. In particular, when the losing
bidder is “strong,” the ownership share of bidding shareholders in the new entity is
given by ξ1max(R
∗, 1), which is lower than the share they would have had without
competition. In addition, competition speeds up the takeover process. That is, the
equilibrium takeover threshold when the losing bidder is “strong” is Rcomp, which is
lower than the equilibrium threshold in the absence of competition.
Second, the value OmBi(X,Y ) of the option to merge is again equal to the product
of the surplus accruing to bidding shareholders at the time of the takeover and a
stochastic discount factor. When there is competition for the target and the second
bidder is strong, the ownership share of the winning shareholders in the new entity
13
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is given by ξ1max(X,Y ), defined in equation (9). This implies that the surplus that
winning shareholders extract at the time of the takeover is equal to the value of the
combined firm minus the maximum value of dealing with the losing bidder. As shown
in Proposition 3 this quantity is equal to: Y KT (α1 − α2) (R∗ − 1). Because the value
of the synergy parameter is unknown to outside stockholders before the takeover, the
value of the option to merge is a weighted average of all possible option values (i.e. over
all possible values αi that have not been eliminated through the updating of beliefs).
Third, although competition aﬀects the sharing of firm value between target and
bidding shareholders, it does not aﬀect the functional form of total equity value after
the takeover. Thus competition has no impact on the functional form of the betas after
the takeover even though it aﬀects the timing of the changes in betas. This is apparent
from the expressions reported in Propositions 1 and 3. Obviously, competition has an
impact on the dynamics of firm-level betas before the takeover through its eﬀects on
the “moneyness” of the restructuring option OmBi(X,Y ) and the equilibrium sharing
rule for the combined takeover surplus.
IV. Empirical predictions
A. Parameter calibration
In this section, we derive the implications of the model for the dynamics of firm-level
betas and expected stock returns. While most of these implications are derived from
closed form results, some will be illustrated through numerical examples. To determine
the values of the quantities of interest, we thus need to select parameter values for the
risk-free interest rate r, the payout rates δX and δY , the diﬀusion coeﬃcients of the
core business valuations σX and σY , the correlation coeﬃcient between core business
valuations ρ, the betas of core assets βX and βY , the synergy parameter α, the takeover
premium ω, and the characteristics of the operating options (Λ, λ) and (Θ, θ). This
section describes how parameters are calibrated to satisfy certain criteria and match
a number of sample characteristics of the Compustat and CRSP data. Due to the
lack of precise data on their value, the parameters in our analysis must be regarded as
approximate. Table 1 summarizes our parameter choices.
The risk free rate is taken as a historical average from the yield curve on Treasury
bonds. Relying on historical data for the U.S., we select payout rates on core assets that
provide average dividend yields consistent with observed yields [see Ibbotson Associates
(2002)]. The diﬀusion parameters of core assets are set to 0.20. This implies that the
average of equity return volatilities is 25%, consistent with time series averages on the
S&P500 [see e.g. Strebulaev (2006)]. While the model allows us to take any size for
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the bidding and target firms we focus thereafter on mergers of equals by assuming that
KB = KT = 1. Firms typically diﬀer in their systematic risk, represented by beta. In
the analysis of stock returns, we normalize the beta of the target’s core assets βY to 1
and examine alternatively cases in which βX is greater (1.5) or smaller (0.5) than 1.
Table 1 Source Parameter Choices
risk free interest rate data r = 0.06
payout rates data δX = 0.005; δY = 0.035
volatilities of core assets data σX = σY = 0.2
correlation coeﬃcient normalized ρ = 0.75
betas of core assets normalized βY = 1
eﬃciency parameter data α/ω = 1
capital stocks normalized KB = KT = 1
expansion option data Λ = 1.15; λ = 0.2
divestiture option data Θ = 0.85; θ = 0.1
The parameter values for the firm’s operating options are selected in such a way
that the firm can either increase or decrease its size by the same fraction, i.e. Λ− 1 =
1−Θ. Since there are more data available for calibrating the parameter values of the
divestiture option, we will start by calibrating the fraction Θ of assets remaining after
the asset sale. In their sample of 102 distressed firms, Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein
(1994) report asset sales averaging around 12% of the book value of assets. Moreover,
21 companies in their sample sold more than 20% of their assets, with a median level of
asset sales of 48% among these firms. Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) study 93 asset
sales of 77 (non-distressed) firms and obtain similar quantitative estimates. Consistent
with these data points, we approximate the fraction of assets sold by setting Θ = 0.85
in our model. For symmetry, we impose Λ − 1 = 0.15, which is consistent with the
estimates reported by Hennessy (2004) regarding investment levels. In addition, we
pick parameter values for λ and θ such that the firm has a 50% probability of exercise
of the follow-up options over a three-year horizon following the takeover.
We calibrate the parameters α and ω using the premium paid to target shareholders
at the time of the takeover. The premium to the target in a takeover can range from
10 to 50% [see e.g. Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and Schwert (2000)]. In our model,
the premium paid to the target above the value of its core assets is given by:
PT = (1− ξ)K−1T S
i(RT m , 1)− 1, i = e, d,
where ξ is the share of the combined firm accruing to bidding shareholders. This yields
a ratio of α/ω = 1 for a premium of 30%.
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B. Asset pricing implications
The decision of whether to merge has important consequences for the systematic risk
of the firm’s operations and expectations of long-run stock returns. Using the results
in Propositions 1, 2, and 3, we examine how the return characteristics of the target
firm and stockholders’ option exercise decisions dynamically impact firms’ systematic
risk and hence expected returns through the merger and restructuring events.
1. Firm-level betas before the takeover
Consider first the dynamics of firm-level betas before the takeover. As shown in Propo-
sitions 1, 2, and 3, the beta of the shares of the bidder prior to the takeover solves:
βt = βX + (ϑ− 1) (βX − βY )
OmB (X,Y )
KBX +OmB (X,Y )
, for t < T m. (12)
In this expression, the first term on the right hand side is the beta of assets in place. The
second term captures the risk of the option to enter the takeover deal. In this second
term, the last factor represents the fraction of firm value accounted for by the option to
merge. The elasticity ϑ of the option price with respect to the underlying asset is strictly
greater than 1 for a call option. Thus when βY = 0, which is the case in standard real
options models with a fixed investment cost, the call option always increases the beta
of the firm before the option exercise. By contrast, when βY 6= 0, which is the case in
mergers and acquisitions, the (call) option might increase or decrease beta depending
on the relative magnitudes of βX and βY . In addition, as the takeover becomes more
likely, the value of the option to merge increases as a percentage of the total value of
the firm. As a result, the impact of the option on beta increases with the moneyness of
the option. Interestingly, these results hold independently of the presence of follow-up
options or competition. These dimensions of the firm’s environment only aﬀect the
magnitude of the predicted run-up or run-down. In particular, since follow-up options
increase the value of the option to merge while competition erodes this value, the run-up
should be greater with more follow-up options and smaller with more competition.
The following Proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 4 When the beta of the core assets of the acquiring firm is larger (resp.
lower) than the beta of the core assets of the target firm, we should observe a run-up
(run-down) in firm-level beta prior to the takeover. The magnitude of the pre-merger
run-up (run-down) is greater when the firm has follow-up options and lower when there
is competition for the target.
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Example. We now turn to a numerical example in which we use the calibrated model
parameters reported in Table 1. Figure 1 plots the beta of the shares of bidding share-
holders before the takeover as a function of the volatility of core business valuations,
the correlation coeﬃcient between these valuations, and the moneyness of the option to
merge (ratio of core asset values) when the beta of the bidder’s core assets is larger (left
panels) or lower (right panels) than the beta of the target’s core assets. In this figure,
the solid line represents a deal in which there is no competition and no follow-up op-
tions. The dotted line considers a deal with follow-up options but without competition.
The dashed line considers a deal without follow-up options and with competition.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
Figure 1 demonstrates that when βY is low (and possibly equal to zero), the call
option to restructure increases firm risk and hence the beta of the shares of bidding
shareholders. This is apparent on the left panels of the Figure, in which the shares’
beta can be greater than the values of both βX and βY . In general, when βY ≥ 0, the
impact of the restructuring (call) option depends on the relative magnitudes of βX and
βY . When βX > βY , a change in input parameter values that increases the likelihood
of a restructuring (i.e. the moneyness of the option) increases the beta of the shares of
bidding shareholders. When βX < βY , the reverse is true. Importantly, and as shown
in Proposition 4, this analysis implies that we should observe a run-up in the beta of
the acquiring firm prior to the takeover when βX > βY . By contrast we should observe
a run-down in the beta of the acquiring firm in transactions for which βX < βY . These
eﬀects are illustrated by Figure 1, which shows the evolution of beta as the ratio R of
core business valuations converges to the takeover threshold.
Recall that in our model the moneyness of the option to merge is captured by
the distance between the ratio of core asset values and the restructuring threshold.
This implies that any change in the firm’s environment that leads to an increase in
the restructuring threshold reduces the moneyness of the option and hence its impact
on firm-level betas. For example, an increase in the volatility or the drift rate of the
bidder’s core assets leads to an increase in the restructuring threshold and, hence, to
a decrease (increase) in the beta of the shares of bidding shareholders when βX > βY
(βX < βY ). By contrast, an increase in the correlation coeﬃcient or in the value of
the synergy benefits leads to a decrease in the restructuring threshold and hence to a
increase (decrease) in the beta of the shares of bidding shareholders when βX > βY
(βX < βY ). This analysis again illustrates the importance of using a two-factor model
that captures the heterogeneity in business risk between bidding and target firm.
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2. Change in beta at the time of the takeover
At the time of the takeover, bidding shareholders exercise their option to enter the
takeover deal, leading to a change in the nature of the firm’s assets and, thus, to a
change in the beta of the shares of the acquiring firm. In particular, when there is no
follow-up option and no competition, the change in beta at the time of the takeover
satisfies (see Proposition 1):
∆βT m = (βY − βX)
∙
(1− α)KT
V (Rm, 1)
+
(ω + α− 1)KT
V (Rm, 1)− ωKT
¸
.
This equation shows that the diﬀerence in betas of the bidding and target firms has a
first order eﬀect on the size of the jump in beta at the time of the takeover. In addition,
since the sunk takeover cost ω is strictly positive, we have the following result.
Proposition 5 When the beta of the core assets of the acquiring firm is larger (resp.
lower) than the beta of the core assets of the target firm, we should observe a reduction
(increase) in firm-level beta at the time of the takeover.
As we show in the example below, the same holds true when follow-up options and
competition are introduced as these dimensions of the firm’s environment only aﬀect
the magnitude of the change and not its sign.
Example. Figure 2 plots the change in the beta of the shares of bidding shareholders
at the time of the takeover as a function of the relative size of the target firm (KT/KB),
the volatility of core business valuations, and the correlation coeﬃcient between these
valuations when the beta of the bidder’s core assets is larger (left panels) or lower
(right panels) than the beta of the target’s core assets. In this figure, the solid line
represents a deal in which there is no competition and no follow-up options. The dotted
line considers a deal with follow-up options but without competition. The dashed line
considers a deal without follow-up options and with competition.
[Insert Figure 2 Here]
Figure 2 demonstrates that exercising a call option leads to a decrease in systematic
risk and hence in expected stock returns only when βX > βY . The figure also reveals
that the follow-up options and competition aﬀect the size of the jump but not its
sign, as conjectured earlier. Finally, and consistent with the discussion reported in
subsection 1, the size of the jump in betas increases with the relative size of the target
firm and the correlation coeﬃcient between core business valuations and decreases with
their growth rates and volatilities. It is important to note however that the relative
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size of the target firm has relatively little impact on the size of the jump in betas at
the time of the takeover (a similar pattern shows up in the empirical section). Figure
3 summarizes the risk dynamics in mergers and acquisitions through the event time
window as captured by an increasing ratio of core assets.
[Insert Figure 3 Here]
In this figure, the solid line represents a deal without competition and follow-up options.
The dotted line considers a deal with follow-up options but without competition. The
dashed line considers a deal without follow-up options and with competition.
3. Change in beta at the time of an option exercise
To investigate further the impact of the option exercise on the beta of bidding share-
holders, we compute the change in betas at the time of the exercise of the operating
option. Using the expression reported in Proposition 2, it is possible to show that when
there is no option to expand we have for t ∈
£T m, T d¤:
lim
R↓Rd
βt =
v(Rd, 1) +Π(ν)
£
θ(Rd + 1)− (1−Θ)V (Rd, 1)
¤
V (Rd, 1) + [θ(Rd + 1)− (1−Θ)V (Rd, 1)] ,
where the term in the square bracket represent the surplus created by the (put) option
to divest assets. Similarly, when there is no option to divest we have for t ∈ [T m, T e]:
lim
R↑Re
βt =
v(Re, 1) +Π(ϑ) [(Λ− 1)V (Re, 1)− λ(Re + 1)]
V (Re, 1) + [(Λ− 1)V (Re, 1)− λ(Re + 1)]
These equations show that the change in beta depends on whether the option being
exercised is a call option to expand operations or a put option to divest assets (this
distinction is captured by the factors Π(ϑ) and Π(ν)).
Example. Figure 4 plots the change in beta occurring at the exercise date of an
operating option as a function of the “exercise price” of the option (λ or θ) and the
volatility of participating firms’ core business valuations when the firm exercises either
an expansion option or a disinvestment option.
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
Consistent with economic intuition, Figure 4 reveals that the exercise of an operat-
ing option triggers a discrete change in the beta of the shares of bidding shareholders.
In addition, the sign of the change depends on the nature of the option available to the
firm. When βY = 0, the change is negative in case of an expansion option as the firm
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is exercising a call option. The change is positive in the case of a disinvestment option
as the firm is exercising a put option. When βY > 0, the sign of the change in the beta
depends again on the relative magnitudes of βX and βY . In particular, when βX > βY
exercising a call reduces the beta of the shares and exercising a put increases the beta
of the shares. When βY > βX (i.e. the beta of the exercise price exceeds the beta of
the underlying asset), the reverse is true.
This analysis again illustrates the impact of the heterogeneity in business risk on the
changes in systematic risk following an option exercise decision and hence the impor-
tance of using a two-factor model. Notably, it shows that the exercise of an expansion
(call) option might not be followed by a decrease in systematic risk if the new project’s
risk structure is not a carbon copy of existing assets’ risk structure. Conversely, the
exercise of a put option might not be followed by an increase in systematic risk. Our
paper therefore contributes to the literature that examines the long-run performance
of firms following acquisitions or divestitures. For example Desai and Jain (1999) re-
port that in their sample of 155 spin-oﬀs from 1975 to 1991, parent firms on average
earn positive abnormal returns of 6.5% to 15.2% over holding periods of one to three
years following substantial divestitures. These results suggest that in their sample we
have βY < βX (this is the case for example if the selling price of assets is constant).
Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2005c) also report a significant change in long-run
stock market performance as following acquisitions (consistent with a drop in beta),
that they explain using a real options model similar to ours.
V. Empirical evidence
This section reports exploratory tests of our theory. We first study abnormal announce-
ment returns to confirm that our data exhibit the same general patterns that have been
reported previously in the literature: acquiring firms earn low or negative abnormal
announcement returns, while target firms earn substantially positive abnormal returns
around the announcement date of the takeover. Second, we document a slight drop in
acquirers’ beta at the announcement of the control transaction for our full sample of
takeover deals. If we control for the relative magnitude of acquirers’ and targets’ betas,
the data exhibit a significant increase (decrease) in acquirers’ systematic risk prior to
the takeover and a significant decrease (increase) thereafter. Third, we provide novel
insights into the long-run return dynamics relating pre-merger run-ups and post-merger
performance to contrast our theory’s predictions with those of a coinsurance eﬀect. The
new evidence in this section is strongly supportive of the model’s predictions regarding
the dynamics of firm-level betas in mergers and acquisitions.
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Our source for identifying control transactions is the Securities Data Company’s
(SDC) U.S. Mergers & Acquisitions database. We apply the following filters to a
preliminary sample that begins on January 1, 1985, and ends on June 30, 2002: (1)
The transaction is completed within less than 700 days (above the 99th percentile of
time between the announcement and eﬀective dates in the preliminary sample). (2) The
acquirer and the target are public firms listed on the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) database. (3) The transaction value is $50 million and higher to limit
ourselves to larger takeovers. (4) The percent of shares acquired in the deal is 50% and
higher to focus on significant share acquisitions. (5) All regulated (SICs 4900—4999) and
financial (SICs 6000—6999) firms are removed from the sample to avoid restructuring
policies governed by regulatory requirements. Transaction value is defined by SDC as
the total value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses. The
SDC database records deals when at least 5% of shares are acquired. As a result of
these selection criteria, our final sample includes 1086 takeovers deals. The sample
ends on June 30 2002 because we will estimate acquirers’ betas for event windows of
up to two years before the announcement and after the eﬀective date of the control
transaction. The average implementation time between announcement and eﬀective
dates in our sample is 143 calendar days.
A. Abnormal announcement returns
The most reliable evidence on whether mergers and acquisitions create value for share-
holders draws on short-term event studies [see Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001)
and others]. Most event studies examine abnormal returns around merger announce-
ment dates as an indicator of value creation or destruction. A commonly used event
window is the three-day period immediately surrounding the merger announcement
date; that is, from one trading day before to one trading day after the announcement.
Table 2 Acquirer CARs Target CARs
[—1,+1] —0.52% 18.21%
t—value —2.26 24.97
N 1086 1086
Table 2 summarizes our findings on abnormal announcement period returns to
shareholders and shows that our data demonstrate the same general patterns that have
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been reported previously in the literature. As in prior studies [see e.g. Bradley, Desai,
and Kim (1988)], we cumulate the daily abnormal return from a market model over a
three trading day period to obtain the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each of
the 1086 takeover transactions. Based on a 90 day estimation period prior to the event
period, we report the average CARs in Table 2.
Relative to the existing evidence on abnormal announcement returns, our sample
firms display similar patterns and economic magnitudes. The returns to shareholders
of acquiring firms are slightly negative, reaching —0.52% on average, which is perhaps
attributable to one of our selection criteria [Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)
report lower abnormal announcement period returns for their subsample of larger trans-
actions]. Interestingly, the average abnormal return for acquirers is reliably diﬀerent
from zero. The returns to shareholders of target firms during the three trading day
event-window average 18.21%. Target abnormal returns are hence economically large
and statistically distinguishable from zero at better than 1%. Finally, we find CARs for
acquiring firms are on average equal to —1.65% in a subsample of 39 deals with multiple
bidders, which is consistent with the predictions of Proposition 3 and Appendix D.
[Insert Figure 5 Here]
To complete the event-window return analysis, Figure 5 details the frequency distribu-
tions of cumulative abnormal announcement returns to bidding and target shareholders.
B. Beta dynamics
We now investigate whether the dynamics of firm-level betas in the time period sur-
rounding the announcement is consistent with our model’s predictions. To this end, we
examine how an average bidding firm’s systematic risk varies through the event window
surrounding a control transaction. Following Carlson, Fisher and Giammarino (2005c),
we divide our sample into twenty-one trading day periods (“event months”) prior to the
announcement and after the takeover. We consider as a single period (“event month
zero”) the interval between the announcement and the takeover, regardless of how long
that interval is. As a result, every event month corresponds to 21 trading days except
for event month zero, which equals on average of 103 trading days for our sample.
Following the high-frequency or “realized beta” approach of Andersen, Bollerslev,
Diebold, and Wu (2005), we estimate monthly betas from daily data. We obtain
daily data of the relevant factors, prices, and returns from WRDS. In particular, the
daily time-series of risk-free interest rates and excess index returns from 1985 to 2002
correspond to one-month Treasury Bill rates (RF) and valued-weighted excess market
returns (MKTRF). For each event month, we estimate linear regressions of daily stock
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returns on daily excess market returns and hence we obtain monthly estimates of each
stock’s alpha and beta according to the market model.7 The term “realized betas” is
used because of the analogy with “realized volatility” calculated from high frequency
observations [see e.g. Schwert (1989)].
Figure 6a displays average monthly beta estimates for the time period surrounding
the announcement date of the control transaction. In this graph, the value of zero on
the horizontal axis corresponds to the announcement date. All negative numbers are
event months prior to the announcement. All positive numbers are event months after
the eﬀective date. Event month zero is the period ranging from the announcement date
to the eﬀective date irrespective of the actual time elapsed. Our analysis in Section
IV predicts an increase (run-up) in acquirers’ systematic risk before the announcement
and a decrease thereafter so long as βX > βY . Figure 6a reveals that betas do not
vary substantially around takeover announcements for the full sample of takeover deals.
Although the average acquiring firm’s beta (βAcq = 1.04) is greater than the average
target firm’s beta (βTar = 0.84) for all 1086 transactions, the increase of beta before the
announcement is not distinguishable from other fluctuations. However, the decrease
of beta in event month zero appears to be present in the data for the full sample. In
addition to the five-month period labeled 0, this decrease in beta lasts for two event
months after the eﬀective date of the control transaction.
[Insert Figure 6 Here]
We attribute this relatively weak support of our model in the full sample to the fact
that the cross-sectional variation in βX and βY is too large to have suﬃcient identifi-
cation. Notably, the standard deviations of acquirers’ and targets’ pre-announcement
betas are around 0.80. We therefore split our sample based on the relative magnitude
of pre-announcement betas to obtain a subsample for which βX > βY and a subsample
for which βX < βY .
8 Figures 6b and 6c show acquirers’ beta dynamics when βX > βY
(641 deals) and when βX < βY (445 deals), respectively. Consistent with our model’s
predictions, we record an increase (run-up) in beta in the last months prior to the
announcement date where the acquirers’ average beta rises from 1.16 up to 1.30. Due
to the option exercise decision, the acquirers’ average beta drops dramatically upon
announcement of the takeover. Our estimate for beta equals 1.09 during event month
7In unreported estimations, we run linear CAPM-like regression of daily excess stock returns on
daily excess market returns without an intercept term. Restricting the intercept to be equal to the
risk-free rate (RF) does not produce qualitatively diﬀerent results.
8Simple computations show that if βX > βY , then the beta of the acquiring firm is greater than the
beta of the target firm (see Appendix C). For the two subsamples, the average acquiring firm’s beta
βAcq = 1.28 (βAcq = 0.69) diﬀers from the average target firm’s beta βTar = 0.60 (βTar = 1.22).
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zero, which corresponds to 103 trading days on average. Thus, as predicted by our
theory, acquirers’ beta first rises slowly and then declines abruptly for the subsample
of deals with βX > βY in Figure 6b.
For the subsample of deals with βX < βY , we observe the reverse phenomenon
in Figure 6c. Beta begins to drop below its unconditional time-series average of 0.95
around 12 months before the announcement (run-down). During the last months prior
to announcement, the acquirers’ average beta declines considerably from about 0.85
down to 0.67. At the announcement date, acquirers’ average beta rises dramatically
because of the option exercise. Specifically, the acquirers’ average beta jumps up from
0.67 to 0.94 in event month zero, which equals almost five calendar months on average.
Thus, as predicted by our theory, beta first declines slowly and then rises abruptly
upon announcement for the subsample of deals with βX < βY in Figure 6c.
[Insert Figure 7 Here]
A potentially important concern regarding the quantitative underpinnings of this
pattern may be related to systematic changes in the acquiring firm’s stock liquidity. In
particular, if beta estimates are biased due to the omission of liquidity-related variables,
changes in liquidity conditions through the merger episode that aﬀect such a bias could
produce apparent changes in beta. To examine this possibility, we use various measures
of liquidity.9 Using daily return and volume observations, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003)
consider the regression coeﬃcient γˆit of the linear model r
e
it = θit+φitrit+γitsign(r
e
it) ·
vit + it, where reit = rit − rft and vit denote excess stock return and dollar volume
of stock i in month t. The coeﬃcient estimate for gamma is a liquidity measure as
volume-related return reversals tend to arise from liquidity eﬀects. We thus stratify
our two samples into “high”, “medium”, and “low” liquidity categories to investigate
whether systematic diﬀerences in stock liquidity through the merger episode explain
changes in systematic risk. These tests are summarized in Figure 7, which shows no
evidence in favor of a liquidity-induced pattern in firm-level beta dynamics.
[Insert Figure 8 Here]
The dynamics of firm-level betas can be studied further by relating run-ups and run-
downs in betas to firm-level variables such as the relative size of acquirers and targets
capital stocks (KB and KT in our model). We therefore construct the variable KBKT,
which equals the logarithm of the acquirer’s divided by the target’s total assets at the
9 In unreported tests, we have not found a liquidity eﬀect when considering subsamples based on share
trading volume (rather than dollar volume). Specifically, we divided our sample into three liquidity
groups based on (1) three-month averages of pre-announcement trading volume and (2) summed up
changes in trading volume over the three month period prior to the announcement date.
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year-end preceding the announcement. We then re-examine the dynamics of firm-level
betas in the full sample as well as in the two subsamples βX > βY and βX < βY . As
charted in Figure 8, we break up each sample based on the median value of KBKT into
“high” and “low” relative size sub-groups. The analysis reveals that the asymmetry
of the model is also apparent in the data where the relative size in the jump in beta is
bigger for lower values of KBKT.10
C. Return dynamics and beta changes
In this subsection, we examine whether long-run post-merger returns and firm-level be-
tas are related to pre-merger run-ups. In our model, more uncertainty regarding synergy
benefits leads to a lower run-up in beta as the exercise of the restructuring option can
not be anticipated by investors. As noted by Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2005c),
since the diﬀerence between pre-announcement and post-announcement returns also
reflects anticipation, post-merger performance relates to run-ups and announcement
eﬀects. For example, smaller run-ups and larger announcement eﬀects should be as-
sociated with less underperformance and a smaller decrease in beta (see also Figure
3). While a coinsurance (diversification) eﬀect may explain post-merger underperfor-
mance, this alternative hypothesis is silent on run-ups (or run-downs) in stock price
and beta before the takeover announcement. We therefore argue that the predicted
relation between run-ups and post-merger performance distinguishes our theory from
an explanation of post-merger performance based on the coinsurance eﬀect.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
In Table 3, we first report estimation results for cumulative abnormal returns
(CARs) from one and two year periods following the eﬀective date of mergers. For
each firm, we determine normal returns using the market model rit = αi + βirmt + it
and compute CARit of firm i on trading day t as CARit =
Pt
j=1(rij−αˆi−βˆirmj), where
t = 252 for CAR1 and t = 504 for CAR2. We regress CAR1 and CAR2 against the
one year run-up in the acquirer’s stock price (RUNUP1), the relative size of acquirers
and targets (KBKT), and the relative pre-announcement risk of acquirers and targets
(RISK). We add several control variables by relying on data from Compustat and SDC.
We include for the announcement eﬀect the three-day CARs (A/E) from Section V.A,
the book-to-market ratio in the year prior to the takeover (B/M), the deal value as
a percentage of the acquiring firm’s market value of equity (D/M), the run-up in the
market portfolio one year prior to the announcement (MKT), the percentage of shares
10When we specify relative size by book value or market value of equity at the fiscal year-end
preceding the announcement date, the results display the same asymmetry as in Figure 8.
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acquired in the control transaction (PCACQ), the logarithm of total assets in the year
prior to the takeover (SIZE), and an intercept term.
A few results stand out in columns (1) and (2). First, the one year run-up is
negative and significant with a t-statistic of 7.79 (8.45) for CAR1 (CAR2).11 Thus,
higher run-ups prior to the takeover announcement lead to more underperformance in
the following two years. In addition, a few other regressors help explain post-merger
CARs. Larger deals as percentage of acquiring firms’ equity value experience reliably
lower post-merger performance. Also, the negative coeﬃcient estimates for relative risk
is statistically significant. This finding directly implies that post-merger performance
is lower (higher) when the pre-merger risk diﬀerential is higher (lower). Though not
statistically significant, smaller acquirers and larger percentages of acquired shares lead
to lower CARs. Overall, the negative relation between pre-merger risk, pre-merger run-
ups and post-merger performance is in line with our theory’s predictions, and cannot
be explained by a coinsurance eﬀect.
In specifications (3)—(8), we study the determinants of changes in betas of acquir-
ing firms, defined as the diﬀerence in systematic risk between the six month window
following the merger announcement and the three month window preceding its an-
nouncement.12 As discussed earlier, we expect the sign of RUNUP1 to be negative, so
that firms with larger run-ups have larger changes in beta at the deal announcement.
For specifications (3)—(5), we include the same regressors as in columns (1)—(2). The
coeﬃcient estimate of the one year price run-up is negative, as expected, and significant
in the full sample. It is, however, of particular importance for the subsample regres-
sion (4) in which acquirer betas exceeds target betas. The weaker statistical relation
between ∆βT m and RUNUP1 in column (5) is potentially due to insuﬃcient cross-
sectional variation in the two subsamples; that is, RUNUP1 is less positive relative to
the subsample in column (4) but it is not negative in the sense of a run-down. A higher
percentage of shares acquired (PCACQ) and higher pre-merger risk-diﬀerential reliably
predict higher changes in beta. Finally, these regressions reveal that the change in beta
at the announcement date is negatively related to the size of the acquiring firm (SIZE).
We next examine the impact RUNUP2, which equals the one year change in the
bidder’s beta (rather than stock price) preceding the announcement date, on the jump
in beta at the time of the takeover in columns (6)—(8). This experiment allows us to
separate our model’s implications for post-merger performance from the ones based on
the coinsurance eﬀect. All other variable definitions remain unchanged. The regression
coeﬃcient corresponding to RUNUP2 in Table 3 is negative and statistically significant
11All t-statistics are computed using White standard errors.
12Unreported regressions for diﬀerent specifications of the post-merger estimation window of firm-
level beta yield qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results.
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at better than 0.1%. This means economically that for βX > βY a run-up in beta
from 0.75 to 1.25 before the merger (i.e. RUNUP2 = +0.5) leads, on average, to a
decrease in beta of ∆βT m = (1.25 − 0.75)(−0.296) = −0.148. On the other hand, an
equivalent run-down in the acquirer’s beta (i.e. RUNUP2 = −0.5) results for βX < βY ,
on average, in an increase in beta of ∆βT m = (0.75 − 1.25)(−0.231) = 0.116 at the
time of the takeover.
The table also reveals that the three-day announcement return and relative size are
marginally significant, while relative risk remains an important determinant of changes
in beta. Acquirer size enters with the predicted sign (a greater size of the bidder leads
to a smaller jump), but the statistical relation is weak. The deal value as a percentage
of the acquiring firm’s market value of equity (D/M) is another interesting control
variable in all specifications. The negative (positive) coeﬃcient estimate corresponding
to D/M implies that, everything else equal, a larger fraction of deal value relative to
equity value leads to a larger change in beta. This finding is consistent with our real
options framework in that the moneyness factor Γ, which represents the fraction of firm
value accounted for by the option to merge, should be increasing in D/M.
VI. Conclusions
This paper develops a real options framework to analyze the dynamics of stock returns
and firm-level betas in mergers and acquisitions. In this framework, the timing and
terms of takeovers are endogenous and result from value-maximizing decisions. The
implications of the model for abnormal announcement returns are consistent with the
empirical evidence. In addition, the model generates new predictions regarding the
dynamics of firm-level betas for the time period surrounding control transactions. In
particular, the model predicts a run-up (run-down) in the beta of the bidding firm prior
to the announcement and a drop (rise) in beta at the time of the announcement when
the acquiring firm has a higher (lower) pre-announcement beta than its target.
Using a sample of 1086 takeovers of publicly traded US firms between 1985 and
2002, we find that beta does not exhibit any significant change prior to the takeover
and drops only moderately after a merger announcement for the full sample. However,
if we split our sample into two subgroups in which acquiring firms have either a higher
or a lower pre-announcement beta compared to their targets, the patterns in the beta
of acquiring firms are consistent with the model’s predictions. Specifically, beta first
increases and then declines upon announcement for the subsample of deals in which
the beta of the bidder exceeds the beta of the target. Beta first declines and then
rises upon announcement for the other subsample of deals. This new evidence on the
dynamics of firm-level betas is strongly supportive of the model’s predictions.
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Appendix
A. Proof of proposition 1, 2, and 3
Denote the value of the bidder’s restructuring option by OB (X,Y ). In the region for
the two state variables where there is no takeover, this option value satisfies
rOB = (r − δX)XOBX+(r − δY )Y OBY +
1
2
σ2XXX
2OBXX+ρσXσYXYO
B
XY+
1
2
σ2Y Y
2OBY Y .
(A.1)
The value function OB (X,Y ) is linearly homogeneous in X and Y . Thus, the
optimal restructuring policy can be described using the ratio of the two stock prices:
R = X/Y . Also, the value of the restructuring option can be written as
OB (X,Y ) = Y OB (X/Y, 1) = Y OB (R) . (A.2)
Successive diﬀerentiation gives
OBX (X,Y ) = O
B
R (R) , (A.3)
OBY (X,Y ) = O
B (R)−ROBR (R) , (A.4)
OBXX (X,Y ) = O
B
RR (R) /Y, (A.5)
OBXY (X,Y ) = −ROBRR (R) /Y, (A.6)
OBY Y (X,Y ) = R
2OBRR (R) /Y. (A.7)
Substituting (A.3)-(A.8) in the partial diﬀerential equation (A.2) yields the ordinary
diﬀerential equation
δYO
B (R) = (δY − δX)ROBR (R) +
1
2
¡
σ2XX − 2ρσXσY + σ2Y
¢
R2OBR (R) , (A.8)
which is solved subject to the the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions
OB (RmB ) = ξ [V (R
m
B , 1)− ωKT ]−KBRmB , (A.9)
OBR (R
m
B ) = ξVR(R
m
B , 1)−KB, (A.10)
as well as the no-bubbles condition limR→0OB (R) = 0. The general solution to (A.9)
is given by
OB (R) = ARϑ +BRν , (A.11)
where ϑ > 1 and ν < 0 the positive and negative roots of the quadratic equation:
1
2
¡
σ2X − 2ρσXσY + σ2Y
¢
(ϑ− 1)ϑ+ (δY − δX)ϑ = δY . (A.12)
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Condition (A.12) implies that B = 0. Using conditions (A.10) and (A.11) it is imme-
diate to establish that
OmB (X,Y ) = Y {ξ [V (RmB , 1)− ωKT ]−KBRmB}
µ
R
RmB
¶ϑ
(A.13)
where the value-maximizing merger threshold threshold satisfies
RmB =
ϑ
ϑ− 1
ξ (α+ ω − 1)KT
(ξ − 1)KB + ξαKT
. (A.14)
Consider next the option to merge for target shareholders. Using the same steps as
above we find
OmT (X,Y ) = Y {(1− ξ) [V (RmT , 1)− ωKT ]−KT}
µ
R
RmT
¶ϑ
(A.15)
where the merger thresholds selected by bidding and target shareholders satisfy
RmT =
ϑ
ϑ− 1
[ξ (α+ ω − 1)− (ω + α)]KT
(ξ − 1) (KB + αKT )
. (A.16)
The equality RmB (αk) = R
m
T (αk) then gives the sharing rule
13
ξ =
(ω + α)KB
(ω + α)KB + αKT
, (A.17)
and the merger threshold
Rm =
ϑ
ϑ− 1
ω + α
α
. (A.18)
One interesting feature of the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 is that it can
be formulated as a surplus-maximization problem for a central planner. The objective
of the planner is to determine the restructuring policy that maximizes the combined
surplus
G (X,Y ) = Y KT [αR− (α+ ω)] . (A.19)
Using similar arguments as above, it is possible to show that the surplus-maximizing
policy is identical to the restructuring policy described in Proposition 1. This feature
is useful to establish the merger threshold reported in Proposition 2.
13When the implementation cost is fully paid by the bidder, the sharing rule for the combined firm
is
ξ =
ω (KB + αKT ) + αKB
(α+ ω)KB + (1 + ω)αKT
.
and the Nash-equilibrium merger threshold is given as in equation (A.18).
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The main diﬀerence between Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 is that one has to
derive first the expansion and disinvestment thresholds Re and Rd as well as the value
of the follow-up options. Denote by Oc(X,Y ) the combined value of the real option to
expand and the real option to divest assets. The thresholds Re and Rd can then be
determined using the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions:
Oc (Re, 1) = (Λ− 1)V (Re, 1)− λ(Re + 1), (A.20)
Oc
³
Rd, 1
´
= θ(Rd + 1)− (1−Θ)V (Rd, 1), (A.21)
OcR (R
e, 1) = (Λ− 1)VR (Re, 1)− λ, (A.22)
OcR
³
Rd, 1
´
= θ − (1−Θ)VR(Rd, 1) (A.23)
Simple algebraic manipulations yield the desired result.
Denote by S(X,Y ) the value of bidding shareholders’ claims. By a straightforward
application of Itô’s lemma, it is immediate that an investment in XSX(X,Y )/S(X,Y )
units of X and Y SY (X,Y )/S(X,Y ) units of Y instantaneously replicates firm value.
As a result, we obtain the beta of the shares of bidding shareholders as a weighted
average of the elasticities of S(X,Y ) with respect to X and Y ,
β = [XβXSX(X,Y ) + Y βY SY (X,Y )] /S(X,Y ). (A.24)
Since the functional form of S(X,Y ) changes through the merger event, so does that of
the beta of the shares of bidding shareholders. Simple algebraic derivations yield the
analytic expressions reported in Propositions 1, 2, and 3.
B. Proof of proposition 4
As shown in equation (12), the beta of the shares of the bidding firm prior to the
takeover is given by:
βt = βX + (ϑ− 1) (βX − βY )Γ(R, 1), (B.1)
where the factor Γ(X,Y ) represents the fraction of firm value accounted for by the
option to merge defined by:
Γ(R, 1) = O
m
B (R, 1)
KBR+OmB (R, 1)
. (B.2)
Since the takeover occurs the first time the process R reaches the constant threshold
Rm from below, we should observe a run-up in R prior to the takeover. In addition,
in this expression the elasticity ϑ is greater than one. This implies that if ∂Γ/∂R > 0,
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then we should observe a run-up in beta prior to the takeover when βX > βY . Simple
calculations give
∂Γ(R, 1)
∂R
=
(ϑ− 1)KBOmB (R, 1)£
KBR+OmB (R, 1)
¤2 > 0, (B.3)
which yields the result in Proposition 4.
C. Subsample selection
In this appendix, our aim is to show that if βX > βY , then the beta of the acquiring
firm is greater than the beta of the target firm. In our base case environment, the betas
of the shares of the bidding and target firm satisfy
βAcq = βX + (βX − βY )
(ϑ− 1) {ξ [V (Rm, 1)− ωKT ]−KBRmB}Rϑ (Rm)−ϑ
KBR+
©
ξ [V (Rm, 1)− ωKT ]−KBRmB
ª
Rϑ (Rm)−ϑ
(C.1)
and
βTar = βY + (βX − βY )
(ϑ− 1) {(1− ξ) [V (Rm, 1)− ωKT ]−KBRmB }Rϑ (Rm)−ϑ
KT +
©
(1− ξ) [V (Rm, 1)− ωKT ]−KBRmB
ª
Rϑ (Rm)−ϑ
(C.2)
so that βAcq − βTar is equal to βX − βY when R tends to zero and decreases with R.
The lowest possible value for βAcq − βTar is reached when R = Rm. Thus, the lowest
possible value for βAcq − βTar is given by
βAcq − βTar = (βX − βY )
½
1− (ω + α)KB
α [V (Rm, 1)− ωKT ]
¾
, (C.3)
which reduces to
βAcq − βTar = (βX − βY )
(KB + αKT )(ω + α) + (ϑ− 1)αKT
KB (ϑ− 1) (ω + α) + (KB + αKT )(ω + α) + (ϑ− 1)αKT
,
(C.4)
Since ϑ > 1 and (α, ω) ∈ R2++, the second term on the right hand side is positive and
less than one. It follows that Sign
¡
βAcq − βTar
¢
= Sign(βX − βY ) when R = Rm.
D. Abnormal announcement returns
In our model, abnormal returns are equal to the unexpected component of the sur-
plus accruing to shareholders divided by shareholder value at the time of the takeover.
When there is competition for the target and asymmetric information, abnormal an-
nouncement returns arise for two reasons. First, market participants have incomplete
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information regarding the takeover surplus. Second, in the case of multiple bidders,
market participants typically cannot identify the winning bidder before the takeover
announcement. At the time of the takeover announcement, uncertainty is resolved by
observing the value of the trigger threshold R∗ (α) and the equilibrium allocation of
the surplus ξ.
Example Assume that there are no operating options and that the prior distribu-
tions of α1 and α2 for outside stockholders are uniform with respective sample spaces
{0.6, 1, 1.4} and {0.95− η; 0.95; 0.95 + η}, with η ∈ (0.05, 0.40). Denote by R∗1 the
equilibrium takeover threshold when (α1;α2) = (1; 0.95) and by R∗2 the equilibrium
takeover threshold when (α1;α2) = (1; 0.95− η). At the time of the takeover, the mar-
ket learns that the true values of α1 and α2 are respectively 1 and 0.95 so that the
value of the shares of the winning bidder becomes (using Y as numéraire):
ξSi(R∗, 1) = R∗1KB + (α1,k − α2,k)KT (R∗1 − 1) (D.1)
= R∗1KB + 0.05KT (R
∗
1 − 1). (D.2)
Just before the announcement of the takeover, the market believes that bidder 1 will
win the takeover contest if α1 = 1 (with probability 1/2). Two scenarios are then
possible: (α1;α2) = (1; 0.95) with probability 1/4 and (α1;α2) = (1; 0.95− η) with
probability 1/4. Hence, the value of the shares of the winning bidder just after the
takeover announcement satisfies (using Y as numéraire):
S1B(R
∗
1, 1) = R
∗
1KB + EQ[1α1>α2OmBi (R, 1)| FT m− ], 1) (D.3)
= R∗1KB +
0.05
4
KT (R
∗
1 − 1) +
0.05 + η
4
KT (R
∗
2 − 1)
µ
R∗1
R∗2
¶ϑ
. (D.4)
Abnormal returns to bidding shareholders at the time of the takeover announcement
are defined as:
ARB =
1
S1B(R
∗, 1)
£
ξSi(R∗, 1)− S1B(R∗, 1)
¤
. (D.5)
Using these expressions, it is immediate to establish that abnormal announcement
returns to bidding shareholders are negative whenever
η > 0.15
R∗1 − 1
R∗2 − 1
µ
R∗1
R∗2
¶−ϑ
− 0.05 (D.6)
These equations show that takeover deals can entail either positive or negative
returns to the winning bidder. The sign of the returns depends on the diﬀerence in
true synergy parameters. For example, if the two bidders are identical, uncertainty in
market beliefs always generates negative abnormal announcement returns. Indeed, in
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this case a bidder’s option to merge is worthless. However, the market’s expectation
of this option is positive. In general, when there is little heterogeneity among bidders,
bidders compete most of the rents associated with the merger away. If the uncertainty
in market beliefs is high, then the market’s expectation of the merger benefits might
exceed its true value. Therefore, the market overestimates the benefits of the merger
and we observe negative abnormal announcement returns for bidding shareholders.
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Table 3: Return dynamics and beta changes. Columns (1)—(2) provide estimation
results for the CARs from a one and two year period following the eﬀective date of the merger.
Columns (3)—(8) analyze the change in betas of acquiring firms, defined as the diﬀerence in
their betas between the six month window following the announcement date and the three
month window preceding the announcement date. RUNUP1 (RUNUP2) is the one year run-up
in the acquiring firms’ stock price (beta). Other variables include the three day announcement
eﬀect (A/E), the book-to-market ratio at the year-end preceding the announcement (B/M), the
deal-to-market value ratio (D/M), the logarithm of the ratio of acquirer to target total assets
(KBKT), the one year run-up in the value-weighted market portfolio (MKT), the percent of
shares acquired (PCACQ), the relative pre-annoucment risk of acquirers and targets (RISK),
and the logarithm of the acquirer’s total asset at the year-end before the announcement (SIZE).
All t-statistics [in brackets] are based on robust standard errors.
CARs: Changes in Beta (∆βTm):
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Regressor: 1 Year 2 Years All βX > βY βX < βY All βX > βY βX < βY
RUNUP1 -0.732 -1.479 -0.221 -0.235 -0.172
[-7.79] [-8.45] [-2.91] [-3.07] [-2.07]
RUNUP2 -0.287 -0.296 -0.231
[-7.29] [-6.95] [-5.11]
A/E -0.725 -1.495 -0.530 -0.152 -0.853 -0.448 -0.148 -0.678
[-1.33] [-1.48] [-1.59] [-0.31] [-2.23] [-1.39] [-0.31] [-1.86]
B/M 0.461 0.803 -0.001 0.014 -0.084 0.059 0.060 0.019
[4.09] [3.71] [-0.01] [0.12] [-0.66] [0.44] [0.56] [0.17]
D/M -0.142 -0.205 -0.072 -0.080 0.048 -0.015 -0.145 0.012
[-3.24] [-2.67] [-1.51] [-2.01] [1.23] [-2.36] [-2.19] [1.09]
KBKT -0.133 -0.189 -0.029 0.013 -0.080 0.029 0.057 -0.033
[-3.56] [-2.81] [-0.89] [0.34] [-2.29] [1.80] [2.38] [-1.37]
MKT 0.820 1.672 0.173 0.064 0.121 0.239 0.221 0.121
[3.28] [3.71] [0.97] [0.25] [0.48] [1.44] [0.93] [0.51]
PCACQ 0.270 0.321 0.252 0.284 0.261 0.086 0.159 0.140
[1.95] [1.39] [2.01] [1.99] [2.09] [1.46] [1.47] [1.51]
RISK -0.067 -0.128 -0.358 -0.403 -0.268 -0.250 -0.300 -0.206
[-2.11] [-2.24] [-9.63] [-7.12] [-4.04] [-7.43] [-5.30] [-3.14]
SIZE 0.024 0.054 -0.037 -0.066 -0.011 -0.037 -0.069 -0.012
[0.97] [1.18] [-2.03] [-2.53] [-0.44] [-2.07] [-2.81] [-0.50]
CONST -0.937 -1.682 0.012 0.126 0.060 0.137 0.341 0.106
[-1.79] [-2.02] [0.05] [0.51] [0.27] [0.84] [1.53] [0.51]
N 831 831 972 573 399 972 573 399
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Figure 1: Beta before the restructuring date. Figure 1 plots the beta of the shares
of bidding shareholders before the takeover as a function of the drift rate and the volatility
of participating firms’ core business valuations, and the ratio of core business valuations when
the beta of the bidder’s core assets is high (left column where βX= 1.5) or low (right column
where βX= 0.5) compared to beta of the target’s core assets (βY = 1). In this figure, the solid
line represents a deal in which there is no competition and no follow-up option. The dashed
line considers a deal with competition but without follow-up options. The dotted line considers
a deal with follow-up options but without competition.
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Figure 2: Change in betas at the time of the takeover. Figure 2 plots the
change in the beta of the shares of bidding shareholders as a function of the relative size of
the target firm KB/KT , the volatility of participating firms’ core business valuations, and the
correlation coeﬃcient between these valuations when the beta of the bidder’s core assets is high
(left column where βX= 1.5) or low (right column where βX= 0.5) compared to the beta of
the target’s core assets (βY = 1). In this figure, the solid line represents a deal in which there is
no competition and no follow-up option. The dashed line considers a deal with competition but
without follow-up options. The dotted line considers a deal with follow-up options but without
competition.
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Figure 3: Risk dynamics during merger episode. Figure 3 summarizes the beta
dynamics through the merger episode by plotting beta as a function of the ratio of core assets.
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Figure 4: Change in betas at operating option exercise date. Figure 4 plots
the change in the beta of the shares of bidding shareholders as a function of the option exercise
price and the volatility of the participating firms’ core business valuations when the beta of the
bidder’s core assets is higher (solid line where βX = 1.5) or lower (dashed line where βX = 0.5)
than the beta of the target’s core assets (βY = 1). The change in beta due to the exercise
of the follow-up option is depicted either at the expansion threshold (left panels) or at the
disinvestment threshold (right panels).
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Figure 5: Announcement returns. Figure 5 plots the frequency distribution of ab-
normal announcement returns to the shareholders of acquiring firms and to the shareholders of
targets based on our full sample of 1086 takeovers from January 1, 1985 to June 30, 2002. The
event window consists of the three trading days immediately surrounding the merger announce-
ment date; that is, from one trading day before to one trading day after the announcement
day.
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Figure 6: Beta dynamics. Figure 6a shows the dynamic pattern in acquiring firms’ betas
for our full sample of 1086 takeovers from January 1, 1985 to June 30, 2002. Figures 6b and
6c plot the beta dynamics when βX > βY (641 deals) and when βX < βY (445 deals). Every
event month corresponds to 21 trading days except for event month 0, which represents with
an average of 103 trading days the time period between announcement and eﬀective date of
mergers. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval of the monthly beta estimates.
−24 −12 0 12 24
Event Months
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
sroriuqcA
'
ateB
βX < βY
−24 −12 0 12 24
Event Months
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
sroriuqcA
'
ateB
βX > βY
−24 −12 0 12 24
Event Months
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
sroriuqcA
'
ateB
Full Sample
41
Fo
r a
n 
el
ec
tro
ni
c 
co
py
 o
f t
hi
s 
pa
pe
r, 
pl
ea
se
 v
isi
t: 
ht
tp
://
ss
rn
.c
om
/a
bs
tra
ct
=8
86
71
4
Figure 7: Beta dynamics and stock liquidity. Figure 7 shows the dynamic pattern
in acquiring firms’ betas depending on the pre-merger stock liquidity as measured by the Pastor
and Stambaugh’s (2003) gamma coeﬃcient from the regression reit = θit + φitrit + γitsign(r
e
it) ·
vit + it, where reit = rit − rft and vit denotes daily dollar volume of stock i in month t.
Figures 7a—7c plot the acquirers’ beta dynamics when βX > βY (634 deals) and Figures 7d—
7f plot the acquirers’ beta dynamics when βX < βY (437 deals). Based on 3-month pre-
announcement averages of γˆits, we divide each sample into three liquidity groups of equal size.
Every event month corresponds to 21 trading days except for event month 0, which represents
with an average of 103 trading days the time period between announcement and eﬀective date of
mergers. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval of the monthly beta estimates.
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Figure 8: Beta dynamics and relative asset size. Figure 8 shows the dynamic
pattern in acquirers’ betas depending on the relative risk and the relative size of acquirors
and targets. Relative size KBKT is defined as the ratio of acquiror’s over target’s total assets.
Figures 8a—8c plot the acquirers’ beta dynamics when βX > βY (562 deals) for subsamples
below and above the median total asset ratio. Figures 8d—8f plot the acquirers’ beta dynamics
when βX < βY (364 deals) for subsamples below and above the median total asset ratio. Every
event month corresponds to 21 trading days except for event month 0, which represents with
an average of 103 trading days the time period between announcement and eﬀective date of
mergers. The dashed lines indicate the 95% confidence interval of the monthly beta estimates.
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